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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Based on a simple framework, this note clarifies the economics behind bank restructuring and 
evaluates various restructuring options for systemically important banks. The note assumes that the 
government aims to reduce the probability of a bank’s default and keep the burden on taxpayers at a 
minimum. The note also acknowledges that the design of any restructuring needs to take into 
consideration the payoffs and incentives for the various key stakeholders (i.e., shareholders, debt holders, 
and government). 
 
If debt contracts can be renegotiated easily, the probability of default can be reduced without any 
government involvement by a debt-for-equity swap. Such a swap, if appropriately designed, would not 
make equity holders or debt holders worse off. However, such restructurings are hard to pull off in 
practice because of the difficulty of coordinating among many stakeholders, the need for speed, and the 
concerns of the potential systemic impact of rewriting debt contracts.  
 
When debt contracts cannot be changed, transfers from the taxpayer are necessary. Debt holders 
benefit from a lower default probability. Absent government transfers, their gains imply a decrease in 
equity value. Shareholders will therefore oppose the restructuring unless they receive transfers from 
taxpayers.  
 
The required transfer amounts vary across restructuring plans. Asset sales are more costly for 
taxpayers than asset guarantees or recapitalizations. This is because sales are not specifically targeted to 
reduce the probability of default. Guarantees or recapitalizations affect default risk more directly. Transfers 
can also be reduced if the proceeds of new issues are used to buy back debt.  
 
Depending on the options chosen, restructuring may generate economic gains. These gains should 
be maximized. Separating out bad assets can help managers focus on typical bank management issues 
and thereby increases productivity. Because government often lacks the necessary expertise to run a bank 
or manage assets, it should utilize private sector expertise. Low up-front transfers can help prevent misuse 
of taxpayer money. Moreover, the design of bank managers’ compensation should provide incentives to 
maximize future profits.  
 
If participation is voluntary, a restructuring plan needs to appeal to banks. Bank managers often 
know the quality of their assets better than the market does. This means banks looking for new financing 
will be perceived by the market to have more toxic assets and, as a result, face higher financing costs. 
Banks will therefore be reluctant to participate in a restructuring plan and demand more taxpayer 
transfers. A restructuring that uses hybrid instruments—such as convertible bonds or preferred shares—
mitigates this problem because it does not signal that the bank is in a dire situation. In addition, asset 
guarantees that are well designed can be more advantageous to taxpayers than equity recapitalizations. A 
compulsory program, if feasible, would obviously eliminate any signaling concerns. Information 
problems can also be mitigated if the government gathers and publicizes accurate information on banks’ 
assets. 
  
In summary, systemic bank restructuring should combine several elements to address multiple 
concerns and trade-offs on a case-by-case basis. In any plan, the costs to taxpayers and the final 
beneficiaries of the subsidies should be transparent. To forestall future financial crises, managers and 
shareholders should be held accountable and face punitive consequences. In the long run, various frictions 
should be reduced to make systemic bank restructuring quicker, less complex, and less costly.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
What is the best policy option for rescuing a troubled systemically important bank? Various 
plans have been proposed, some of which have already been implemented around the world. 
Examples include capital injections in the form of equity or hybrid securities (such as convertible 
debt or preferred shares), asset purchases, and temporary nationalizations. However, the various 
restructuring options are rarely evaluated and compared with each other based on a coherent 
theoretical framework. This note develops such a framework. 2 
 
Claims often heard in the public debate can be clarified and evaluated using this framework. 
Should bad assets be sold off before a bank is recapitalized? Should hybrid securities, such as 
preferred stock or convertible debt, be used rather than common stock in recapitalizations? Is it 
possible to restructure a bank balance sheet without resorting to a bankruptcy procedure and 
without involving public money? Is it better when taxpayers participate in a rescue plan in order 
to benefit from upside risk? 
 
We make three main points:  
• In principle, restructuring can be done without taxpayer contributions;  
• If debt contracts cannot be renegotiated, taxpayer transfers are needed, but some schemes 
are more expensive than others; and 
• Once the relevant market imperfections are taken into account, restructuring is likely to 
require actions both on the liability and the asset sides.  
 
The goal of restructuring is assumed to be a lower probability of the bank’s default with a 
minimal taxpayer burden. We start our analysis with a simple frictionless benchmark, following 
Modigliani and Miller (1958). We then exclude the possibility of debt renegotiation. This 
approach illuminates a key conflict between shareholders and debt holders. Later, we introduce 
more realistic assumptions, for example, the costs of financial distress and asymmetric 
information. 
 
In the frictionless framework, debt contracts can be renegotiated easily and the default 
probability of a bank can be lowered by transforming some debt into equity (debt-for-equity 
swap). This restructuring preserves the financial value of both debt and equity. Therefore, there 
is no need for public involvement to decrease the probability of default. In practice, however, 
such restructuring is often difficult because of the speed of events, the dispersion of debt holders, 
and the potential systemic impact.  
 
When debt contracts cannot be renegotiated, taxpayer transfers are necessary in order to carry 
out a restructuring plan. The debt holders see the value of their claim go up, thanks to a lower 
                                                 
2 If a bank is not systemically important, a government should apply standard procedures, such as those defined in 
the “Prompt Corrective Action” law in the United States.  
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default probability. Absent government transfers, their gain equals the loss in equity value; 
shareholders would therefore oppose the restructuring.  
 
Transfers vary depending on the plan. The level of transfers reflects how much debt holders 
benefit from the restructuring. Most options are equivalent to a simple recapitalization, in which 
the bank receives a subsidy conditional on the issuance of common equity. The transfer can be 
reduced if the proceeds of new issues are used to buy back debt. Restructuring involving asset 
sales turns out to require more transfers than recapitalization. 
 
We next examine how to design restructuring outside the Modigliani and Miller framework. 
Specifically, we examine cases in which restructuring can bring economic gains—for example, 
the bank can gain new customers who were previously apprehensive. The potential for private 
surplus can facilitate restructurings and reduce taxpayer cost. In maximizing the total surplus 
(i.e., private surplus and social benefits), we find both pros and cons of key strategies. The 
restructuring plan should include contingent transfers so that a bank manager has an incentive to 
try to make the bank profitable. Up-front transfers should be minimized to prevent misuse of 
taxpayer money. Separating bad assets from a bank helps managers focus on standard bank 
management and can therefore increase productivity. Some assets may be underpriced compared 
with their fundamental value as a result of lack of liquidity and deep-pocket investors. In such 
cases, it may be optimal for the government to buy them. However, because the government 
often lacks the necessary expertise, it is advisable to use private expertise to run an asset 
management fund or a nationalized bank. Finally, from a long-run perspective, managers and 
shareholders should be sufficiently penalized to prevent future financial crises.  
 
We also investigate the role of asymmetric information—when banks know more about their 
assets than the public does. When that is the case, banks are more reluctant to participate in a 
restructuring plan and demand additional taxpayer transfers. This is because participating banks 
may be perceived by the market to have more toxic assets and to need more of a capital buffer. 
Such negative market perception induces a lower market valuation and higher financing costs. 
The use of hybrid instruments, such as convertible bonds or preferred shares, mitigates the 
problem because it does not signal that the issuer is in a dire situation. Asset guarantees turn out 
to be even more advantageous. To eliminate participation-related transfers, a compulsory 
program, if feasible, is the best. In addition, the government should gather accurate information 
on underlying assets through rigorous bank examination and utilize it in designing restructuring 
options.  
 
In summary, we find that the best course for a government is to combine several restructuring 
options to solve the multifaceted problems. On the one hand, rescue plans determine how the 
surplus from restructuring is shared among debt holders, equity holders, and taxpayers. On the 
other hand, the surplus from restructuring itself varies depending on the plans, since they change 
the behavior of the various parties. The best overall strategy involves both asset- and liability-
side interventions. 
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The note proceeds as follows. Section II introduces the benchmark Modigliani-Miller 
framework. Section III assumes no scope for debt renegotiation and compares several 
restructuring options under fixed restructuring surplus to achieve the target default probability of 
a bank. In Section IV, under various frictions, we examine how the restructuring design affects 
the surplus. Section V discusses the willingness of banks to participate in a plan when asset 
quality is known only by bank managers. Section VI analyzes other considerations, namely, 
political constraints and a worst-case scenario in which bankruptcy is inevitable. Section VII 
reports case studies for Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Section VIII 
concludes. 
 
II.   A BENCHMARK FRICTIONLESS FRAMEWORK 
We begin by analyzing the restructuring of a bank in a simple framework in the spirit of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958). We show that the bank can decrease its probability of default to 
any target level by converting some debt into equity. A restructuring can be carried out in such a 
way that both equity holders and debt holders are not financially worse off. 
 
A.   Setup 
A bank manages an asset A currently (time 0), which will have a final value A1 next period (time 
1). The final value A1 is stochastic. It is drawn from a cumulative distribution function (CDF), F. 
The capital structure at time 0 is debt with face value D, which needs to be repaid at time 1. 
Equity has book value E (see Figure 1a). Absent restructuring, the probability of default of the 
bank at time 1, p, is the probability that the next-period value A1 will be less than the debt 
obligation D, that is, p = F(D) (see Figure 1b). 
 
The assumptions of Modigliani-Miller are complete and efficient markets, without any 
information frictions. Under these assumptions, the sum of the market values of debt and equity 
is independent of the bank’s capital structure and equals the market value of the asset: V(A) = 
V(E) + V(D) (see Figure 1c). We also assume D < V(A), implying that the bank is not currently 
insolvent, but we do assume a positive default probability.3 The market value of debt V(D) is 
thus smaller than the book value D.  
 
Assuming large social costs associated with default of a systemically important bank, the 
government’s objective can be stated as lowering the default probability or, in practice, 
                                                 
3 A more practical definition of insolvency is regulatory insolvency. In this case, certain positive equity is required 
in order to be solvent, that is, a bank is solvent if the book value of assets is large enough (A > D + required 
capital). However, the thrust of the analysis would not change, and thus a simple condition of solvency, V(A) > D, is 
used throughout this note. 
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achieving a target default probability p* = F(A*).4 A bank restructuring problem amounts then to 
finding a way to achieve p = p* starting from a higher default probability, p > p*. 
 
 
Figure 1a. Assets and Liabilities of the Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b. Cumulative Distribution    Figure 1c. Sharing Rule 
 Function of Ex Post Asset Value     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.   First Best—Voluntary Debt Restructuring 
The government’s objective is to decrease the probability of default p while making no one 
financially worse off. This is feasible by a change in the structure of claims, namely, the partial 
transformation of debt into equity. More specifically, a restructuring that leaves both debt and 
equity holders indifferent is the conversion of debt D into a combination of lower-face-value 
debt (D’ = A*) and an additional piece of equity with value V(D) – V(D’). This is a (partial) debt-
                                                 
4 A* = F–1(p*) is the marginal threshold of the realization of A1 to achieve the target default probability. Put 
differently, if the debt is restructured to have face value A*, then the default probability will be p*. Note that the 
social costs associated with default are assumed not to be sensitive to the recovery rate of debt in the event of 
bankruptcy. 
 
Default probability
DA*
p*
p
A1 D
Debt
Equity
A1
Payoffs of claim-holders at time 1
D
 
A
E
D
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for-equity swap. The new financial stake of the initial debt holders is worth V(D’) + ( V(D) – 
V(D’) ), which is by design unchanged from the original market value of debt V(D). The firm’s 
future cash flows are unchanged, and only the sharing rule for these cash flows has changed, so 
that the total value of the firm is unchanged (following the Modigliani-Miller theorem). Because 
the value of the claims that belong to the initial debt holders is unchanged, the value of the equity 
of the initial shareholders remains the same as well.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the change in the liability structure induced by this partial debt-for-equity 
swap that makes the probability of default equal to p*. The total payment promised to debt 
holders decreases from D to A*. This is illustrated by the downward shift of the horizontal line 
for debt payoff in Figure 2. After the restructuring, a fraction of the equity is held by the initial 
debt holders to compensate them for the decrease in the value of debt. Thus, when the bank does 
not default, equity accounts for a larger fraction of the asset’s payoffs. Graphically, the equity 
line shifts up. The full conversion of debt into equity against a fraction of equity would also be a 
solution to the restructuring problem. Either scheme can be implemented by means of a debt-for-
equity swap.5 
 
 
Figure 2. Debt-for-Equity Swap 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. RESTRUCTURING WITH NO DEBT RENEGOTIATION  
Although the proposed debt-for-equity swap is the first-best solution, it is often a difficult 
solution to implement in practice. A major reason is the speed of events, which leaves no time 
                                                 
5 This scheme is possible only when debt holders and equity holders negotiate freely and reach agreement easily. In 
practice, this is difficult outside a bankruptcy regime. Zingales (2009) advocates this solution by changing the 
bankruptcy law for banks. Note that in this truly frictionless framework, it is sufficient to prevent default with an ex 
post debt-for-equity swap that triggers when the realized asset value is less than the debt obligation, A1 < D. In other 
words, no ex-ante restructuring is needed. 
D
Debt
Equity
A1
Payoffs of claim-holders
A*
A*
D
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for negotiation. The possibility of a deposit run calls for speedy resolution, while dispersion of 
bank debt holders requires a lengthy negotiation process. An orderly bankruptcy might be the 
most efficient way to structure the renegotiation process, but might negatively impact other 
systemically important institutions. In what follows, we assume that the government wants to 
avoid such a bankruptcy procedure because of the potential systemic costs.  
 
With no renegotiation of debt contracts and no help from the government, a restructuring that 
reduces the probability of default increases the value of the debt and thus decreases the value of 
the equity. Therefore, it will be opposed by shareholders. A restructuring thus will not happen 
unless the government provides subsidies in some form or makes participation compulsory. We 
examine in this section various possible restructuring options that do not involve renegotiation of 
the debt contracts. We also assume that transactions with external parties other than the 
government are carried out at a fair price (i.e., reflecting expected discounted cash flows) and 
that markets are efficient. This means that, for these external parties, financial transactions must 
be zero net present value (NPV) projects. 
 
Many schemes are equivalent, though not all. The reason is that some imply a higher recovery 
rate for debt in case of default than others. Asset sales, for example, are more expensive than 
subsidizing the issuance of common equity. The optimal scheme is a form of partial insurance on 
the assets’ payoff. Changing the liability side by subsidized debt buyback is an option close to 
the optimal scheme.  
 
A.   Difficulty of Voluntary Restructuring 
Without debt renegotiation and in the absence of transfers from the government, all restructuring 
that lowers the default probability p would be opposed by equity holders. This is because such 
restructuring increases the value of debt at the expense of equity (the debt overhang problem; see 
Myers, 1977). Indeed, debt holders are better off in every possible scenario—the default 
probability of a bank becomes lower and the recovery rate in the event of default becomes 
higher. The value of debt thus increases from V(D) to V’(D) and, without third-party 
involvement, the increase in debt value is precisely compensated by a decrease in equity value, 
V’(E) – V(E) = – ( V’(D) – V(D) ) < 0 . The worse off the bank is initially, the larger V(D) – 
V’(D) and the larger the loss imposed on shareholders. Shareholders of more distressed banks 
thus tend to be more reluctant to restructure. 
 
Shareholders need to be either forced or induced through subsidies in some way by the 
government to approve such restructuring. Their approval is needed, because they have control 
rights as long as the bank does not default. The transfer needed from the government is equal to 
the increase in the value of debt, T = V’(D) – V(D). This transfer equals the expected discounted 
value of immediate and future payoffs from the government. Under this transfer, the value of 
equity remains unchanged. We now examine in detail how this transfer varies across different 
restructuring schemes.  
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B.   Government Subsidy and Debt Recovery 
All restructuring schemes that achieve a target default probability p* must therefore involve a 
subsidy from the government. The size of this subsidy determines the degree of the debt’s safety. 
From this perspective, among the schemes we will examine, asset sales appear to be the most 
costly for taxpayers. This is because whatever the final realization of A, asset sales imply the 
largest increase in debt recovery and therefore the largest transfer to debt holders. Figure 3 gives 
a preview of our results, illustrating the recovery schedule of debt for various realizations of A 
and various types of restructuring. Restructuring shifts the default threshold to the left (from D to 
A*) and changes the payoff to the debt holders in case of default D<A*. This new recovery 
schedule can vary depending on the restructuring plan (three different slopes in Figure 3). 
Restructuring that creates higher recovery schedules is more costly to taxpayers, since it 
(indirectly) transfers more value to debt holders. 
 
 
Figure 3. Restructuring and Debt Recovery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.   State-Contingent Insurance: Optimal Subsidy 
We first describe the restructuring scheme that minimizes the transfer from taxpayers. The size 
of the transfer can be expressed graphically as a function of the asset’s realization A1 (Figure 4a). 
Figure 4b shows the corresponding debt recovery. Because the objective is to decrease the 
probability of default, there is no need to improve the recovery of debt in case of default. 
Graphically, default occurs in the left part of the figure, A1<A*. The government should make no 
transfer in this region (Figure 4a). This leaves debt recovery unchanged from the prerestructuring 
situation (Figure 4b). When the realized asset value A1 is between A* and D, the bank needs a 
transfer D – A1 from the government so that it is able to repay D to debt holders and avoid 
DA*
Debt Recovery
A1
(without restructuring)
Asset Sales
Security Issues or Guarantees
Debt Buybacks
D
default
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default. When the realized A1 is above D, no subsidy is needed to avoid default. In other words, 
the optimal restructuring is a guarantee under which the government transfers money ex post 
only when the bank is in default but not far from solvency. This scheme would not provide any 
transfer to debt holders when default is inevitable (A1 < A*) or when the bank can repay debt on 
its own (A1 > D).6 
 
The relative cost to taxpayers of various types of restructuring depends on how close they are to 
implementing this optimal debt-recovery schedule. This scheme might be difficult to implement 
and calibrate in practice, but it provides three useful insights. First, to decrease the probability of 
default, the government does not have to subsidize the recovery rate for all the realized value of 
the assets. It should instead focus on avoiding default only when the bank is close to solvency. 
Second, it is not necessarily a bad deal that the taxpayers do not receive any upside or even any 
positive cash flow in exchange for their intervention. Some of the rescue schemes we will 
examine below occasionally provide payments to taxpayers. This optimal scheme never provides 
any payments to taxpayers, but its overall cost to taxpayers is the lowest. Third, more transfers 
could boost the share price, but a higher share price does not mean a good rescue plan from the 
point of view of taxpayers.  
 
 
Figure 4a. Transfer of the Optimal Subsidy   Figure 4b. Recovery Rate 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
D.   Recapitalization with Common Equity 
One straightforward way of decreasing the default probability is to issue new equity and keep the 
proceeds as cash. This makes the debt less risky. Bankruptcy occurs then with prob(A + Cash < 
D), equivalently, prob(A < D – Cash) or F(D – Cash). The minimum amount of cash that has to 
                                                 
6 Here, we assume that the social benefits from saving a systemically important bank are limited, and thus the 
government will not transfer funds beyond the upper limit D – A*. However, if there is a need to transfer money to 
counterparties in case of default, a subsidy that gives higher debt recovery given default A < A* may be optimal. 
DA*
Debt Recovery
A1
A*
D
DA*
Government Ex Post Transfer
A1
D-A*
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be raised is such that p* = F(D – Cash), that is, Cash = D – A*. This is shown as the intercept of 
the debt recovery schedule in Figure 5. For a given realization of asset value A1 that forces the 
bank into default (A1 < A*), and the debt holders can then recover cash in addition to the 
remaining assets, D – A* + A1.  
 
Because default occurs less often and the recovery rate is higher, the value of debt increases from 
V(D) to V’(D). The new equity holders do not make or lose money by investing (efficient 
markets). Assuming no government subsidy, the gain of debt holders V’(D) – V(D) is obtained at 
the expense of the old equity holders, who will lose exactly that amount. This implies that they 
would oppose the restructuring. Issuance of equity is dilutive for preexisting shareholders not 
because an equally large pie is now divided among more shareholders—in fact, the pie is bigger 
because of the proceeds of the new equity issue—but because the debt holders receive more of 
the pie. 
 
To make the restructuring acceptable to shareholders, the value of the equity should not decrease. 
To this end, a possible policy option is for the government to give the bank cash in the amount of 
V’(D) – V(D) conditional on the bank’s issuance of equity of an amount D – A* – ( V’(D) – V(D) 
) at a fair price reflecting the expected discounted value of future payouts to shareholders. With 
the total new cash D – A*, the probability of default becomes p*. The market value of the debt 
jumps by V’(D) –V(D) and the government loses exactly that amount, so that, as planned, 
shareholder value is unchanged (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Recapitalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E.   Recapitalization by Issuance of Preferred Stock or Convertible Debts 
Instead of issuing equity, banks could issue hybrid securities such as convertible debt or 
preferred stock.7 This would not change the analysis done in the previous section. In these cases, 
the debt-recovery schedule of initial debt holders is the same as in Figure 5, implying that the 
                                                 
7 Issuance of new (nonconvertible) debt would increase the default probability and is thus not a possible 
restructuring scheme. 
DA*
Debt Recovery
A1
D-A* (without restructuring)
(with restructuring)
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restructuring’s impact on preexisting debt value, V’(D) – V(D), and thus the transfer of the 
taxpayer, is the same as in a recapitalization through the issuance of equity. 
 
To show that the recovery of preexisting debt is the same as in Figure 5, there are two cases to 
consider separately. In the first case, the new claims do not trigger default. This applies to 
preferred stock or convertible debt with a conversion option at the issuer’s discretion, since the 
dividends do not have to be paid out (preferred stock) or debt converted into equity (convertible 
debt) when the bank is unable to pay dividends or coupons. In this case, the amount of capital 
that needs to be raised to achieve the target default probability p = p*, and thus the recovery 
schedule of initial debt, remains the same as in the case of recapitalization with common equity. 
The second case involves the issuance of convertible debt, with the conversion not determined 
by the issuer (i.e., the conversion is automatic or at the holder’s discretion) and seniority equal to 
that of preexisting debt. 8 The recovery rate is in proportion to total debt (pari passu)—so the 
slope of the recovery is the same as in the equity issue case (see Figure 6a). At the same time, the 
trigger point for defaults after restructuring is set to be A* as in the equity issuance case. Thus, 
the recovery of preexisting debt is exactly the same as in the equity issuance case.9 
 
Figure 6a. Same Seniority Convertible 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6b. Recapitalization with Hybrid Securities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Modigliani-Miller: Cash = V(New Claim) 
                                                 
8 Conversion options in hybrid securities are discussed further in section V A below. 
9 It is more costly for taxpayers to issue convertible subordinated debt (i.e., junior to preexisting debt) with 
conversion not determined by the issuer. In this case, although the trigger point is still the same as in Figure 6a, the 
preexisting debt holders will be given priority in case of default. This extra gain imposes an extra cost on taxpayers. 
A
E
DCash
New
claimA
E
D
DA*
Debt recovery
A1
D-A*
(Preexisting Debt)
(Total Debt)D’
D
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To make equity holders willing to accept the restructuring, the government has to compensate 
them with a conditional transfer identical to the one needed in the case of an equity issuance. 
Indeed, total wealth before and after the restructuring remains the same (conservation of value). 
That is, the sum of the changes in wealth of initial equity holders, initial debt holders, new claim 
holders, and taxpayers is zero. Because new claims are issued at a fair price, the new 
claimholder’s wealth is unchanged. Provided the restructuring needs to leave initial equity 
holders’ wealth unchanged, the taxpayer transfer should be equal to the change in debt value. 
This is the same as in the case of an equity issue. 
 
F.   Subsidized Debt Buybacks 
When equity or other securities are issued, banks do not have to keep the proceeds on their 
balance sheet and might as well use them to buy back some debt. This decreases the transfers 
from taxpayers required to implement p = p*. The bondholders that sell to the bank are not 
assumed to be naïve—they know that the value of the debt will rise as a result of the 
restructuring and therefore agree to sell only at the fair price that reflects the postrestructuring 
value of their claim.10 The fraction α of outstanding debt that needs to be bought is such that (1 – 
α) D = A*, and the remaining debt contracts are untouched, so the new aggregate face value of 
the debt is (1 – α) D = A*. After the announcement, the value of the initial debt should increase 
from V(D) to V’(D), reflecting the lower default probability after the restructuring. Out of this 
initial debt, a fraction α is bought by the firm at a value α V’(D), while a fraction (1 – α) remains 
outstanding, with market value (1 – α) V’(D).  
 
To leave the equity holders indifferent, the government needs to subsidize the buyback. In 
exchange for the transfer, the bank should be willing to issue equity to buy back a fraction α of 
the debt. Equivalently, the government can directly buy debt at the postrestructuring market price 
and convert it into equity at a conversion rate that leaves equity holders indifferent. 11 As in the 
other schemes, the optimal size of the government transfer is equal to the increase in debt 
holders’ wealth created by the restructuring, V’ (D) – V(D). Whether they keep their bonds or sell 
them, all initial debt holders receive this gain on a pro rata basis. The remaining debt is a fraction 
(1 – α) of the initial debt. The gains of the remaining debt holders are (1 – α) of the gains of all 
the initial debt holders. Thus, the transfer by the government can be calculated by rescaling the 
realized recovery of the remaining debt by a factor 1 / (1 – α) (the upper line in Figure 7). This 
total implied recovery reflects the restructuring effects on the full initial debt.  
 
 
                                                 
10 Note that this is a conservative assumption in evaluating taxpayer transfers, since it implies that the firm is not 
able to buy back debt secretly and restructure afterward by surprise.  
11 Note that this scheme is equivalent to finding some debt holders that agree to convert into equity at the 
postrestructuring price, which is higher than the current market price but below the face value. 
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Figure 7. Debt Buyback 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This scheme is less costly for taxpayers than a recapitalization in which cash from new issues is 
kept on the balance sheet. Indeed, the recovery schedule (upper line of Figure 7) of this scheme 
is lower than the recovery schedule of the recapitalization in Figure 5. Economic intuition 
suggests that buying back debt and converting it into equity is closer to the first-best solution 
(i.e., debt-for-equity swap agreed to by debt holders). Altering the liability structure decreases 
the size of the transfer required from the government (see Bulow and Klemperer, 2009). 
 
G.   Simple Asset Guarantees 
An alternative way to decrease the default probability down to p* is for the government to offer 
full or partial insurance on the bank’s assets using simple asset guarantees. To limit the cost to 
the taxpayers, such insurance can have a cap (partial insurance). For instance, to reach a default 
probability p*, the government can insure against the value of assets falling below D, with a 
maximum transfer of D – A*. This guarantees that the bank is able to repay its debt fully as long 
as A1 ≥ A*. In contrast to the optimal scheme, however, this transfer will be paid even in the 
worst cases, A1 < A* (see Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8. Transfer under Capped Asset Guarantee 
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This scheme leaves the equity value unchanged from the prerestructuring situation (all transfers 
benefit debt holders) and has exactly the same cost for the government as a recapitalization that 
involves subsidizing new securities issues (equity or hybrids). This is because the implied debt 
recovery is identical to that in Figure 5. Compared with the optimal partial insurance scheme in 
Section C, this plan is more costly, since it makes debt recovery higher in case of default. A full 
insurance scheme (without the transfer cap) would cost taxpayers more, since it involves higher 
payments in the worst cases, A1 < A*. 
 
It is always optimal for taxpayers to insure total assets as opposed to a specific subset of them. 
Future payoffs of a subset of assets do not perfectly predict the default of the bank as a whole. 
Thus, higher transfers (as a precautionary cushion) are necessary to achieve the same default 
probability. 
 
H.   Caballero’s Scheme 
Ricardo Caballero (2009) has a proposal that can be described as follows: If the bank issues new 
equity in the amount of D – A* to private investors, the government provides a loss guarantee for 
the new equity owners by promising to buy back the new equity at a fixed price in the future. In 
other words, the government distributes free put options to the new equity holders. The floor 
price can be set by backward induction. Specifically, the government transfer should be set to 
equal the gains of debt holders, V’(D) – V(D). This makes the current equity holders willing to 
adopt this scheme as it leaves their wealth unchanged.  
 
In terms of transfer by the government, Caballero’s scheme is equivalent to the subsidized 
recapitalization with common equity (Figure 5), since it implements the same debt recovery 
schedule, D – A* + A1. It differs from the subsidized equity issues in that it requires no up-front 
transfer by the government. 
 
I.   Above-Market-Price Asset Sales 
Another alternative is to sell a fraction a of the assets to the government at an overvalued price 
with markup m, that is, (1 + m) a V(A), to achieve the target default probability p = p* without 
dilution for shareholders.12 The proceeds of the sale are again kept as cash on the balance sheet. It 
turns out that the government transfer needed for these asset sales is larger than for all the 
mechanisms considered so far. 
 
To see this, note that the new assets owned by the bank are cash and remaining old assets, (1 + 
m) a V(A) + (1 – a) A, which have higher expected value and lower risk than the original assets A 
                                                 
12 The parameters a and m can be picked as the solutions of two equations. The first equation states that the 
probability of default is p*, (1 + m) a V(A) + (1 – a) A* = D. The second equation states that the negative NPV of 
the government’s injection covers the increase in the value of debt, a m V(A) = V’(D;a) – V(D)—new value of debt, 
V’(D;a), depends on the sales fraction a. 
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(see Figure 9a). Because default occurs less often than in the do-nothing case, the value of the 
debt increases by V’(D) – V(D). This jump is larger than in the case of recapitalization with 
common-equity issuance with the same default probability p*, since the recovery rate for every 
realization A1 is larger.13 This is illustrated by a simple graphical intuition showing that the slope 
of the recovery schedule in the default zone is now (1 – a) instead of 1 (see Figure 9b). Note that 
it is irrelevant whether the government or private investors hold the assets, as long as the 
government subsidizes the price by a markup m so that it provides the subsidy required to 
compensate equity holders. 
 
Figure 9a. Assets and Liabilities after Asset Sales of a Fraction a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9b. Debt Recovery after Asset Sales of a Fraction a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 The probability of default is equal to prob( (1 – a) A < D – cash ), equivalently, prob( A < (D – a V(A) ) / (1 – a) 
). Hence, the required fraction of assets a should solve (1 – a) A* = D – a V(A). For a given realization of asset value 
A1 that makes the bank default (A1 < A*), the debt holders recover cash a V(A) and liquidation value (1–a) A1, that is, 
D – (1 – a) (A* – A1), which is more than in the equity issue case, D – (A* – A1). 
A
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J.   The Sachs Proposal 
Sachs’s (2009) proposal is a variant of asset sales. Instead of using a market price, Sachs 
proposes to sell a fraction of assets at book value to the government to avoid immediate write-
downs, but with a condition that requires the bank to pay ex post the government’s losses when 
the assets are sold off later (recourse condition). Sachs proposes to use newly issued equity to 
compensate the government for the losses ex post. More specifically, the government would hold 
warrants entitling it to receive common stock equal in value to the eventual loss from the sale of 
the assets. The current equity holders would bear the costs through the dilution.  
 
This plan includes a hidden subsidy from the government to debt holders. Indeed, the probability 
of default is now lower and the recovery rate higher. The government does not recover anything 
unless all debt has been repaid, because the value of the equity is zero in case of default. 
However, equity holders become worse off under this plan. On the one hand, if the asset value 
turns out to be lower than the book value, equity holders face the same payoff as in the do-
nothing case—the government receives the difference between the book value and the realized 
value. On the other hand, if the asset value turns out to be higher than the book value, the initial 
equity holders receive only the initial book value. Therefore, the impact of the plan on the value 
of the equity is negative: Equity holders would oppose it. 
  
K.   Combining Several Schemes 
A bank restructuring plan can be designed by combining multiple schemes, such as asset sales 
and recapitalization. As long as banks have to participate in all schemes or none, the overall 
transfer matters, but not the origin of the transfer. For example, a higher asset sales price can be 
compensated by a lower subsidy to new equity issues. However, if banks can choose to 
participate in some schemes but not others, subsidies must be chosen optimally on a scheme-by-
scheme basis rather than as a whole. 
 
IV.   PRIVATE AND SOCIAL SURPLUS FROM RESTRUCTURING 
We can think of the future cash flows of a bank as a pie shared between shareholders and debt 
holders. Restructuring can increase the size of this pie. To this end, the government needs to pay 
attention to the various stakeholders’ payoffs and incentives . For example, decreasing the 
probability of default might attract customers who were previously worried about the bank’s 
high probability of failure. This potential private surplus can facilitate restructuring and reduce or 
even eliminate the need for transfers from taxpayers. Contrary to the clear-cut picture that 
emerges from the previous section, an optimal restructuring plan is no longer easy to identify. 
Actual plans may need to combine features of various schemes considered so far. For example, 
relying exclusively on asset guarantees might diminish managerial incentives to optimize ex post 
asset payoffs, but relying exclusively on ex ante cash injections might create opportunities for 
managers to increase their own private benefits.  
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A.   Key Concepts 
Costs of Financial Distress 
It is widely recognized that a high probability of default reduces a firm’s total value (the value of 
equity plus liabilities). We can say that a bank is in financial distress when this decrease in value 
becomes economically significant. In our exposition, we will associate financial distress with a 
probability of default p > p*. A small fraction of the costs of financial distress is composed of 
the direct, ex post costs of bankruptcy (e.g., legal fees), but a large fraction is composed of 
indirect, ex ante costs. For example, depositors, interbank market counterparties, and employees 
tend to avoid a bank close to bankruptcy. Managerial attention might be diverted to keeping the 
company afloat rather than managing projects. In addition, some positive-value projects, such as 
new lending opportunities, may not be undertaken by a financially distressed bank,14 which 
reduces the total value of the firm (debt overhang).15 All in all, lowering the default probability 
of a bank (from p to p*) can create some extra value, which we call the private restructuring 
surplus.  
 
A parsimonious way to introduce the potential gains from restructuring is to assume that when 
the probability of default is higher than p*, the ex post payoff of assets becomes less than its 
potential by an amount C.16 The restructuring is then a positive-sum game over the surplus C to 
be shared between debt and equity holders. The corporate finance literature estimates that, for a 
typical nonfinancial company, these costs of financial distress are about 10 percent to 23 percent 
of ex post firm value (Andrade and Kaplan, 1998). The surplus can be generated if the default 
probability becomes less than p*. Because there is a (private) surplus (C) to share, the incentives 
to find an agreement through renegotiation are higher than in the frictionless case. 
 
Social Benefits and Government Participation 
Restructuring a systemically important bank is likely to bring aggregate economic gains, in 
particular when it is near collapse.17 The magnitude of the social benefit B determines the upper 
                                                 
14 This is because a significant fraction of the value generated by these projects would go to the debt holders, 
whereas the costs would be fully paid by the equity holders. Because the latter have the control rights, the bank will 
not finance these projects (Myers, 1977). There is a vast amount of literature on the costs of financial distress and 
debt overhang, for example, summarized in Tirole (2006). 
15 Liquidity policies aim at reducing the cost of financial distress and may indirectly reduce the probability of 
default. Examples include accommodating monetary policy (both conventional and unconventional measures), loss 
guarantees for debt holders, and (implicit) subsidies for new lending. Such policies are outside of the scope of this 
note. 
16 In other words, the cumulative density function of default probability F shifts to the right when a restructuring 
occurs, and becomes F’(●) = F(● + C). 
17 A key risk is the collapse of the decentralized payment system (see Rochet and Tirole, 1996).  
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limit of government’s willingness to pay for a restructuring plan. The social benefit depends on 
how much other banks are affected by the bank’s failure (putting the functioning of the payment 
system at risk) and on how unexpected the default event is.18  
 
Allowing for government intervention, restructuring a bank becomes a positive-sum game where 
the total surplus S = C + B is shared among three parties: equity holders, debt holders, and the 
government. There can be three cases. 
 
• If the private restructuring surplus for a bank is more than the improvements in debt 
value by the restructuring, C > V’(D) – V(D), government intervention is not needed. The 
government should resist attempts by the other stakeholders to extract a subsidy.  
• If government intervention is needed, the government is willing to pay a transfer T as 
long as the aggregate benefit is bigger than this transfer, B > T. The minimum cost for the 
government to achieve p = p* is V’(D) – V(D) – C, that is, the change in debt value net of 
the private surplus created by the restructuring.  
• If the social benefits are small, B < V’(D) – V(D) – C, aggregate surplus is still positive 
but too small to leave the debt contract unchanged and make both equity and the 
government better off. In this case, the government needs to organize renegotiation of the 
debt contract to reach a mutually beneficial restructuring. 
B.   Endogenous Surplus and Restructuring Design 
Both the private and social surplus created by decreasing the bank’s default probability are not 
purely exogenously given, but are affected by the design of a restructuring plan. Among the 
various schemes that achieve the target default probability p = p*, those that maximize the 
restructuring surplus B + C are the most efficient—they will minimize the transfer required from 
taxpayers—and thus should be pursued.19 We analyze several relevant frictions, such as the 
allocation of talent and managerial incentives, which should be taken into account when 
designing a restructuring plan. 
 
Allocation of Talent 
Span of Control and Attention: To increase bank managers’ productivity, it may be useful to 
remove toxic assets from a bank. This can be done either through asset sales or by splitting a 
bank into a “good” bank and a “bad” bank. Removing distressed assets from the managers’ 
span of control allows them to focus their attention on typical bank operations, without spending 
                                                 
18 Government also has a direct stake in the bank, since it typically provides deposit insurance. 
19 In fact, the optimal p* can be determined by maximizing total surplus S as a function of restructuring design, 
taking into account the optimal bank capital structure, payment-system implications, and macroeconomic 
consequences.  
 21
 
 
 
much time on bad-asset management, which other specialists, such as vulture-fund managers and 
bankruptcy lawyers, can handle with more expertise.  
 
Expertise: Managerial decisions should be in the hands of agents equipped with the appropriate 
level of expertise and experience. This concern is particularly relevant when public control is 
involved in a restructuring. The mechanisms through which managers are appointed and 
monitored should be carefully designed when the government inherits some control rights. This 
principle should apply to both banks and asset management companies. In other words, bank 
restructuring, particularly asset sales, should involve some form of public-private partnership. 
One way to select managers in a transparent and efficient way (i.e., without leaving them 
excessive rents) is to auction off the management contracts to a predetermined group of 
professional investors who meet certain standards of quality. 
  
Moral Hazard (Hidden Actions) 
Free Cash Flow (Looting of Subsidies): Injecting public money up-front before the asset’s 
payoffs are realized may offer bank managers an unnecessary opportunity to use public money 
for their private benefit, such as larger bonuses and perks. In addition, shareholders may demand 
more dividend payments. To reduce this problem, a government should try to use ex post rather 
than ex ante transfers. For example, asset guarantees are immune to this ex ante looting 
possibility, since they do not provide managers and shareholders with an opportunity to misuse 
public money. 
 
Incentives to Run a Restructured Bank: Bank managers should be given incentives to maximize 
the final payoff A1. For example, asset guarantees may reduce managerial incentives to maximize 
the asset’s payoffs A1 as well as shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers. The implications 
of this concern are thus the opposite of the previous one. The optimal solution depends on the 
relative importance of both frictions. A reverse problem occurs in Sachs’s proposal, in which 
assets are bought at face value by the government and banks commit to pay the losses ex post—a 
full guarantee by banks about ex post payoffs might provide poor incentives to the government 
or the manager of the asset management company to maximize asset liquidation values.  
 
Concerns about the Future 
Positive Medium-Term Effects of Convertibles: A restructuring plan should be evaluated not only 
on its effect on the following period but on subsequent periods as well. It can minimize the costs 
of financial distress in the future by including a plan of action in case the bank’s outlook 
deteriorates further. In particular, adding a convertible feature to new debt-like claims enhances 
surplus, since it can be seen as an automatic restructuring plan for future periods. Suppose, for 
example, that a bank raises capital in the initial period through convertible debt, but that the 
default probability in the future turns out to be higher than expected. In this case, the bank (the 
issuer) would convert the convertible debt to common equity, thereby reducing the default 
probability in the future (Stein, 1992). 
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Long-Run Impact: To prevent future crises, it is important to recognize the long-run effect of a 
restructuring plan. The moral hazard problem inherent in too-big-to-fail institutions is increased 
if the current punishment of managers and equity holders (and then bondholders) was small and 
transfers from taxpayers were large.  
 
 Undervaluation Resulting from Limits of Arbitrage 
We have so far assumed efficient markets, such that market valuation V(A) always coincides 
with the fundamental value of assets, J(A) (i.e., the discounted value of future cash flows). 
However, the market does not always price assets at their fundamental value. Undervaluation of 
assets does not necessarily stem from irrational behavior of market participants. It can result 
from a lack of deep-pocket arbitrageurs. The price of an asset depends on liquidity constraints of 
market participants and can drop following negative shocks to the liquidity available for funding. 
Because the government is less constrained, such limits of arbitrage in the market may create a 
situation in which the market price of the asset V(A) is lower than the pricing by the government 
VGOV(A). The difference in pricing creates a motive to trade between market participants and the 
government. The surplus from restructuring a bank should include this arbitrage gain to the 
government, VGOV(A) – V(A).  
 
If indeed they are undervalued in the market, toxic assets might be bought by the government 
above the market price but below their fundamental value, with a net gain from the point of view 
of the taxpayers. The arbitrage gains are largest if the government purchases the most 
underpriced assets from banks. The arbitrage gains of the government are smaller if its claims in 
the banks or in the vehicles holding toxic assets are more debt-like than equity-like. A debt 
claim’s payoff is capped, and therefore does not vary with the underlying asset’s final payoff 
when it is large. By contrast, an equity claim’s final payoff keeps increasing with the underlying 
asset’s payoff, allowing the arbitrage to be large. This is also the case for a highly distressed debt 
instrument that behaves like an equity. If the government relies on private investors to purchase 
toxic assets from banks at their fundamental value, the government may use a part of the 
potential arbitrage gains VGOV(A) – V(A) as an incentive for private managers and ensure their 
participation.  
 
Note that, when computing the fundamental value of an asset, the same cost of capital should be 
applied, whether by a private market participant or by the government. It is not the cost at which 
debt can be issued by the entity but the cost that reflects the risks of the specific asset. In the 
current context, both the government and market participants should value a bank at the same 
fundamental value J(A)—the sum of future profits discounted with the risk premium associated 
with assets, but without including a liquidity premium associated with the financing constraints 
of a specific entity. The arbitrage gains, if any, exist because the market participants cannot 
purchase at this fundamental value as a result of funding liquidity constraints, not because the 
fundamental value for the government is different from the fundamental value for the market 
participants (the cost of capital fallacy). 
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V.   PARTICIPATION ISSUES UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
When the asset quality of banks is unknown to market participants but known to managers, 
participation in a restructuring plan tends to signal negative information about asset quality. This 
makes banks reluctant to participate in a plan without a high subsidy. This reluctance comes in 
addition to the reluctance induced by the debt-overhang problem analyzed earlier (Section III). 
The additional subsidy required to overcome the signaling problem can be reduced if the plan 
uses asset guarantees or hybrid securities rather than equity issues. A compulsory program, if 
feasible, reduces the taxpayer burden. Rigorous bank examination can also mitigate the problem 
if the results can be communicated credibly to market participants.  
 
A.   Recapitalization with Asymmetric Information on Across-Bank Asset Quality 
In the presence of asymmetric information, managers have private information on the 
fundamental quality of their assets J(A). 20 The market values the bank asset at the average quality 
V(A). If private information could credibly be made public, high-quality banks would be valued 
above market value. Otherwise, the information gap remains. 
 
Voluntary Participation 
We now analyze how to induce banks to participate in a recapitalization plan. Assume there are 
two types of banks: one with high-quality assets and the other with low-quality assets. We focus 
on the case in which even banks with high-quality assets need restructuring. The default rates of 
low-quality banks (pL) and high-quality banks (pH) are both higher than the threshold level, pL > 
pH > p*.21 The goal of the government is to make sure that both types of systemically important 
banks achieve the target level of default probability p* while minimizing taxpayer transfers to 
those banks. 
 
When banks participate voluntarily in a restructuring plan that involves claims issued to private 
investors, managers of above-average banks demand high subsidies from the government. The 
reason is that the high-quality bank cannot signal its true value. Thus, when issuing new financial 
claims on assets based on the market perception, existing shareholders would bear an unfair 
burden: because new claim holders would price the new claims below their fundamental value, 
the issue would take place at a discount, at the expense of existing shareholders. This discount 
must be compensated for in the transfers the government provides. 
 
                                                 
20 How a bank evaluates securities and business loans is difficult to know. Under the current accounting rules, even 
securities with market prices do not need to be evaluated at the market price (they can be “marked to model”). 
Moreover, the composition of assets is also difficult to know, at least in real time. 
21 The assumption is not restrictive. The case in which high-quality banks are healthy (i.e., pH < p*) can be analyzed 
in a similar fashion. 
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Without a high subsidy, high-quality banks would opt out of the plan. Given this behavior, even 
low-quality banks would not participate in the plan. If they participated, their identity would be 
revealed and their assets would be valued at their true, low level J(AL). This would further 
increase the cost of their financial distress.22 
 
Therefore, the government needs to pay a high subsidy to induce all banks to participate in the 
plan. As a result, low-quality banks would be oversubsidized, benefiting from an informational 
rent. At the same time, high-quality banks would end up overrecapitalized by the plan because 
they received the same treatment as the low-quality banks. 23  
 
Role of Hybrid Securities 
To induce voluntary participation in a plan involving the issuance of new equity, the subsidy 
from taxpayers would have to be high. This is because the information gap between the 
fundamental value and the market value of the equity is large for a high-quality bank. Debt 
would be an ideal claim to issue, because the gap is small as a result of its flat-payoff shape.24 
Unfortunately, issuing debt is not useful, since the goal of restructuring is to decrease the default 
probability. However, hybrid debt-like claims can be used to decrease taxpayer costs, since their 
value is less sensitive to private information than equity. In addition, hybrid securities such as 
convertible notes, subordinated debt, and preferred shares can be (partially) counted as 
regulatory capital. 
 
• Convertible notes can be seen as essentially “backdoor equity” if the exercise of the 
conversion option is mandatory or at the discretion of the holder. It is a way to issue 
equity while reducing the information-based cost of equity issues. For a specified period 
(typically, a few to several years), it has the payoffs of a debt contract and can be 
converted after that at the discretion of the holder into a prespecified number of equity 
shares. Figure 10 illustrates the final payoffs of a convertible note, with conversion at 
time 1 at the holder’s discretion. Notations are identical to those of Section III, and D0 
denotes the initial debt’s face value. The slope of the equity portion of the payoff line of 
                                                 
22 Negative market perception translates into a high financing cost in the interbank market and even a possible bank 
run. A similar situation was analyzed first by Majluf and Myers (1984). 
23 Although it is not always possible, the government could save some informational costs by differentiating 
between two types of banks in a separating equilibrium in which low-quality banks self-select into equity-based 
recapitalization that does not attract high-quality banks. However, the costs of asymmetric information would not be 
removed completely, since the issuance of equity by low-quality banks occurs at a high financing cost, which would 
need to be compensated for. A separating equilibrium would require a menu of contracts that are quite sensitive to 
distributional assumptions on asset quality among banks and are difficult to implement in practice. We therefore 
refrain from the analysis.  
24 Debt is said to be less information sensitive, whereas equity is information sensitive. 
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the security on the right of the graph is proportional to the conversion ratio (i.e., the 
number of shares each convertible note converts into).  
Figure 10. Convertible Note 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unlike the issuance of additional debt, issuing convertibles allows a decrease in the 
probability of default. This is because the cash raised by issuing the convertible is the 
value of the debt portion plus the equity portion of the convertible’s future payoffs. If the 
equity portion is large enough, the amount of cash raised is larger than the promised debt 
payment D, so that the issue decreases the probability of default. The choice of the 
conversion ratio needs to solve a trade-off: on the one hand, the higher the conversion 
ratio, the lower the probability of default becomes, since more cash is raised initially; on 
the other hand, when the conversion ratio is lower, the payoff is flatter overall and 
therefore less sensitive to information on the final payoff. In line with theory, stock 
market reactions to convertible issues are typically much less negative than for equity 
issues. If the conversion is automatic after a certain time, rather than left to the discretion 
of the holder, the equity feature of the convertible is stronger (everything else equal). 
Thus the signaling cost is higher.25  
• Preferred shares essentially work as a credit line: payments are fixed but can be skipped, 
in which case they accumulate at a certain rate. This type of claim is clearly less 
information sensitive than equity (because payments are fixed) but more sensitive than 
debt (the firm can skip payments when in distress). Therefore, the costs for initial 
shareholders of issuing preferred shares should be lower than for issuing common equity. 
                                                 
25 If the option or timing of conversion is at the discretion of the issuer, the issuer will convert in bad times, not in 
good times, so that the convertible issue will lose its signaling virtues. This contrasts with the benefit under the other 
objective, as it is clearly a good instrument for a bank in distress, especially from a medium-term perspective (see 
Section II E). 
D A1-D0
Convertible note’s payoff
D
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Note that features of preferred shares and convertibles (or any hybrids) can be combined 
in practice.  
Optimality of Asset Guarantees or State-Contingent Transfers 
The cost of asymmetric information can be mitigated if the government proposes transfers that 
do not involve the issuance of new securities and that are contingent on the realization of asset 
values. From the point of view of asymmetric information frictions, among the restructurings 
considered so far, asset guarantees, either the optimal partial insurance scheme or the second-
best capped transfer contingent on default, appear to dominate all restructuring plans involving 
the issuance of a claim on the assets. If a plan does not ask anything from banks in return, every 
bank will participate in the plan (no signaling). The government should compute A* using the 
payoff distribution of the low-quality bank. By doing so, it overinsures the high-quality banks as 
in recapitalization cases (they will have a default probability lower than p*), but there is no need 
to overtransfer to low-quality banks, unlike under recapitalization cases, in which they benefit 
from an informational rent (subsidy to compensate the stigma of issuing equity).  
 
Compulsory Programs  
The costs associated with asymmetric information stem from the need to ensure that banks 
voluntarily participate when participation is regarded as a bad signal about the quality of a 
bank’s assets. However, the government does not need to use a voluntary program. Rather, it can 
use a compulsory program targeting a specific set of banks (e.g., mandatory equity issuance 
proposed by Rajan, 2008; and Diamond and others, 2008). By doing so, the government can 
largely mitigate the asymmetric information problem. A compulsory program, however, may 
need specific changes in the legislation and might not be feasible when systemic risk is 
imminent. 
 
B.   Asset Sales with within-Bank Adverse Selection (“Lemons” Problem) 
Some bank assets are of higher quality than others, and managers have private information on 
their quality. If given the opportunity, banks will sell lower-quality assets. The government 
should factor in this behavior and pay only the price that reflects the anticipated quality of assets, 
which could be determined by an auction mechanism (see Ausubel and Cramton, 2008). 
 
Balance Sheet Externalities: The price of sold assets determines the book value of bank assets 
(under mark-to-market accounting) and therefore the compliance of banks with regulatory 
solvency ratios. If a government purchases an asset at the price of low-quality assets, it may 
force a bank into regulatory insolvency. This is because this bank (as well as all other banks) 
needs to book all assets at this price. A consequence would be that all banks will write down 
equity or set limits on asset growth (i.e., credit crunch). This in turn justifies subsidized sales 
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prices. This argument has, however, no economic motive other than regulatory constraint, since 
rational market participants are aware that banks sell their worst assets.26 
 
 Correlation between the Amount of Toxic Assets and Overall Asset Quality: If a bank sells more 
toxic assets to the government than the average bank, market participants will infer that the 
bank’s asset quality is below average.27 This might create reluctance to participate in the plan as a 
result of the negative signal. 
 
C.   Use of Government Information 
Bank Examination: If the government obtains more accurate information about bank assets from 
their rigorous examination (e.g., a stress test), the government can reduce the cost of any 
restructuring plan by disclosing the results to inform investors.  
 
Asset Guarantee: Asset guarantees without a cap on transfers put taxpayers at risk and thus can 
work as a credible signal that the government is confident about the downside risk of assets. In 
contrast, a public statement without such a commitment would not be a credible signal. In turn, 
asset guarantees can convince investors to invest in the bank at a price that may not be dilutive 
for existing shareholders.  
 
Caballero’s Scheme and Commitment on Future Policy: Insurance on the stock price of a bank, 
as in Caballero’s (2009) proposal, is also a way to send a credible signal about a government’s 
confidence in the asset quality of a bank as well as future policies of the government. For 
example, by guaranteeing the stock price, nationalization with high dilution of shareholder value 
becomes a more costly option for the government. This, in turn, can make equity more valuable, 
especially if private investors do not believe the government’s denial of future nationalization 
because of a time-inconsistency problem. 
 
VI.   OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
A.   Political Constraints 
Opportunity Cost for the Government: If the government has limited overall resources, it should 
take into account the restrictions that the restructuring scheme puts on other investments. In 
                                                 
26 Regulatory reform is beyond the scope of this note. However, we would like to note that weakening mark-to-
market accounting would intensify the degree of the asymmetric information problem. To mitigate the regulatory 
distortion, it would be better to design countercyclical capital-ratio regulation while keeping mark-to-market 
accounting. 
27 Philippon and Schnabl (2009) analyze a case in which the asset quality and future profits are uncorrelated. In this 
case, the problem regarding the asymmetric information on asset quality and the problem of revealing future profit 
opportunities are distinct from each other. If the government uses only one tool (e.g., asset purchase or 
recapitalization), there can be a preferable policy—recapitalization with common equity in their analysis. 
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addition, given political pressures and fiscal rules, the cost of mobilizing liquid resources 
immediately may be high (see discussions in Johnson and Kwak, 2009). In this case, preference 
might be given to mechanisms such as asset insurance or Caballero’s scheme (insurance on new 
stock issues), which involve only ex post transfers. However, a credible plan on how to honor 
these transfers should be in place.  
 
Political Influence on Management: If a government continues to be a major shareholder for a 
long period, a general problem for state-owned enterprises would emerge. Voting-rights holders 
are supposed to monitor management, but the government is not equipped for this function. 
Mismanagement would be likely to occur often, since the government lacks expertise and might 
be subject to political pressures concerning the bank’s lending policy. This would discourage 
participation in a restructuring plan, if voluntary. Recapitalization by hybrids, without voting 
rights, would be less likely to induce this type of mismanagement. If there is little chance of 
selling public stakes quickly, one way to avoid the inefficiency resulting from public control is to 
have the government hold common equity without voting rights. However, with a large disparity 
between control rights and cash flow rights, another type of mismanagement may arise. For 
example, other shareholders might use their de facto control power to misuse the bank’s profits 
at the expense of the taxpayers (tunneling). In addition, note that even without voting rights, the 
government (or parliament) could influence—at least partially—managerial decisions, if a bank 
participates in any government-led restructuring plan.  
 
B.   If Bankruptcy Is Inevitable 
If the realized asset value is less than the threshold level (A1 < A*), the optimal response of the 
government is to let the bank go bankrupt (A* is chosen that way). In particular, if the bank is 
under heavy liquidity pressure in the market or from depositors, other options may not be readily 
available. Still, the government should make the bankruptcy less destructive. For a typical 
distressed firm, private equity funds or rival firms would take over immediately. However, there 
is not much time for those investors to conduct due diligence for a bank. This is partly because 
banks are highly leveraged and may collapse quickly before the due diligence is completed. 
Moreover, bank assets are much more opaque, compared with the assets of firms in other 
industries, so that due diligence requires more time, likely a half year or more.  
 
To carry out an orderly resolution, temporary nationalization is inevitable.28 This strategy 
essentially mimics a private solution for a severely distressed firm in other industries (i.e., 
vulture funds). By holding a large share of common equity, the government can control the 
bank’s management. In particular, the government can acquire all the necessary information to 
assess asset values and liquidity conditions more accurately and quickly. As the majority owner, 
the government is in a strong position to ask debt holders and other stakeholders to share the 
                                                 
28 This solution is the norm for smaller banks. See also cases for systemically important banks in Japan, in 
particular, Long-term Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2008). 
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burden. As a consequence, the government can limit the taxpayers’ burden, expedite the 
resolution process, and sell out the bank to private investors.  
 
If temporary nationalization is unavoidable, further discussion is needed about the scope of debt 
to be honored, in addition to deposits covered under deposit insurance or any other instruments 
covered under various insurance schemes. Even without any prearrangement, to save the 
payment system—at least in the short term—transaction-purpose instruments should be honored, 
for example, interbank market borrowings. There is less justification for honoring long-term 
debt. However, further discussion is needed on other transaction-purpose instruments, such as 
bank guarantees on securities backed by credit card debt and accounts payable.  
 
VII.   CASE STUDIES 
A.   Switzerland: Good Bank/Bad Bank Split in the Case of UBS 
Information on Bank Asset Quality and Participation 
The Swiss case in fall 2008 was relatively straightforward. There are only two systemically 
important banks in Switzerland. Only one of them, UBS, had substantial exposure to U.S. 
subprime mortgage securities by fall 2008. Therefore, the Swiss authorities focused their 
restructuring efforts on UBS. UBS voluntarily participated in the plan. Credit Suisse was initially 
offered the opportunity to participate in the same plan but declined.29  
 
Overview 
The plan is a combination of asset sales to an asset management fund (“bad bank”) and 
recapitalization by convertible notes. Almost all transfers are up-front. UBS is not liable for 
future losses on transferred assets but keeps a partial share of its upside. There are two potential 
sources of subsidies: (1) the price of transferred assets could be higher than the fundamental 
value of the assets net of the buyback option’s value, and (2) the issuance price of convertible 
notes could be above fundamental value.  
 
Asset-Side Restructuring: Asset Sales 
In October 2008, the Swiss authorities and UBS removed toxic assets by creating a special 
purpose vehicle to hold them (StabFund) under the Swiss National Bank.30 The StabFund was to 
be the “bad bank,” and the remainder of UBS was supposed to become the “good bank.” Up to 
$60 billion in toxic assets was allowed to be removed from UBS, whose assets totaled almost $2 
trillion at that time. UBS provided 10 percent of asset value (i.e., up to $6 billion) for the equity 
                                                 
29 Credit Suisse raised $10 billion in new capital by selling equities and hybrids to private sources (including a 
sovereign wealth fund). 
30 The assets purchased were primarily U.S. and European residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities. 
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of the bad bank but immediately transferred the equity ownership to the Swiss government for 
$1. This would cover the first 10 percent of losses of the StabFund. The Swiss National Bank 
lent the StabFund additional funding, up to $54 billion at the London interbank offered rate 
(LIBOR) plus 250 basis points. The future loss of the StabFund would not be charged to UBS 
(nonrecourse condition), but UBS retained some upside option.31 In the end, UBS transferred 
only $39 billion worth of its assets to the StabFund. The price was set by an independent 
valuation process. 
 
Figure 11. UBS Restructuring (Announced Plan) 
    (Billions of U.S. dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Liability-Side Restructuring: Recapitalization 
UBS received $6 billion from the Swiss government by issuing mandatory convertible notes at 
12.5 percent interest. The proceeds were intended to finance UBS’s equity injection in the 
StabFund, which was immediately valued at $1. If UBS had transferred the assets limit of $6 
billion, there would have been no increase in the book value of capital for UBS. However, 
because UBS ended up transferring only about $4 billion to the StabFund, UBS was able to 
retain $2 billion worth of capital in net. 
                                                 
31 Once this loan is fully repaid by the StabFund, UBS can exercise its option to repurchase the fund equity by 
paying the Swiss National Bank $1 billion plus 50 percent of the equity value at the time of exercise in excess of $1 
billion. 
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Corporate Governance 
The UBS shareholders had already suffered through voluntary recapitalization in April 2008 by 
new equity issuance (rights issue) without any public help. The old management also had to exit 
in April 2008, at the annual general meeting of the shareholders, when UBS asked for the rights 
issue.32  
 
B.   United Kingdom: Recapitalization and Asset Guarantee for RBS and Lloyds-HBOS 
Overview 
The U.K. case combines recapitalization and asset guarantees. The initial state-financed 
recapitalization in fall 2008 of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds-HBOS appeared to 
be an emergency rescue, rather than a preventive measure, since it was done after the realization 
of large valuation losses. On the other hand, asset protection introduced in January 2009 is a 
preventive measure to avoid future defaults. The government also asked the banks to continue 
lending to homeowners and small businesses. 
 
Liability-Side Restructuring: Recapitalization 
In the United Kingdom, by fall 2008, it became clear that RBS and HBOS were in trouble. In 
October 2008, the U.K. authorities decided to offer a recapitalization scheme to systemically 
important banks, targeting RBS and Lloyds-HBOS.33 The government injected capital with 
preferred shares and ended up owning 58 percent (₤20 billion) of RBS total ownership and about 
44 percent (₤17 billion) of Lloyds-HBOS.  
 
Asset Guarantees Combined with Government Ownership 
In January 2009, additional measures were taken. A large portion of RBS and Lloyds-HBOS 
assets were guaranteed (Asset Protection Scheme): ₤325 billon (14.5 percent) of end-2008 assets 
                                                 
32 The first-round recapitalization by RBS was in October 2007 by convertible note issues to a sovereign wealth 
fund of Singapore and a private investor from the Middle East. 
33 RBS raised capital using a rights issue in April 2008, without government help. Lloyds was relatively healthy 
before acquiring troubled HBOS. In October 2008, as a liquidity measure, the Credit Guarantee Scheme was also 
introduced and applied to a wider set of banks. This provided insurance for debt holders and in turn lowered 
financing costs of banks. In January 2009, the Asset-Backed Securities Guarantee Scheme was introduced to 
complement the Credit Guarantee Scheme, since the latter excludes nonstructured instruments. This new scheme 
essentially aims to facilitate new mortgage lending, since it guarantees the value of originally AAA-rated mortgage-
backed securities issued only after January 2008. 
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for RBS and ₤260 billon (23.4 percent) of end-2008 assets for Lloyds-HBOS.34 If the valuation 
of assets were to fall below a particular threshold,35 the government would compensate the loss 
up to 90 percent.  
 
This guarantee was not offered for free. The insurance fees were to be paid in preferred shares. 
For Lloyds-HBOS, the government would own close to 50 percent of the total economic stake. 
For RBS, in addition to insurance fees, the government also announced an extra injection of 
capital through preferred shares. The government economic stake would rise to more than 80 
percent. With the conversion of preferred shares to common equity, the voting rights share of the 
government for RBS became about 70 percent. 
 
Corporate Governance 
As the majority shareholder, the government needs to monitor bank management. Already in the 
October 2008 plan, the government obtained the right to appoint new independent nonexecutive 
directors. In addition, the government limited executive compensation and dividend payouts.  
 
C.   United States: The Geithner Plan as of May 2009 
Background on the Geithner Plan 
Information on Bank Asset Quality in Fall 2008 
In the United States, the relative asset quality of systemically important banks was not fully 
known in fall 2008. The authorities needed to take into account this lack of information when 
they designed the first-round rescue plan at that time.  
 
Across-the-Board Recapitalization 
Given the information problem, the Treasury encouraged many banks to participate in a 
recapitalization program. Banks could receive cash by offering preferred shares to the Treasury. 
The recapitalization was across the board with few conditions.36 This was done under the Capital 
Purchase Program as a part of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (Paulson Plan) in October 
and November 2008. 37  
                                                 
34 As an expansion of monetary policy (i.e., liquidity injection), the Asset Purchase Facility was introduced in 
January. It was funded by the Treasury and established within the Bank of England. The Bank of England has been 
using it to improve corporate credit liquidity and to meet the inflation target. 
35 This is tailored to each bank. The first loss amounts (i.e., threshold) are ₤19.5 billon (6 percent) of protected assets 
for RBS and ₤25 billion (9.6 percent) of protected assets for Lloyds-HBOS. 
36 Some conditions (e.g., limit to executive compensation) were applied ex post. 
37 As a liquidity measure, new debt holders of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) member banks were 
temporarily insured by FDIC under the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. Moreover, the Federal Reserve 
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Targeted Restructuring for Citibank and Bank of America 
An exception was made in the case of Citibank in November 2008 because of an urgent 
situation. Citibank received additional recapitalization as well as asset guarantees from the 
Treasury, FDIC, and Federal Reserve. In January 2009, both measures were formalized as the 
Targeted Investment Program and Asset Guarantee Program, respectively, and extended to 
Bank of America. Terms and conditions were determined on a case-by-case basis. 
 
The Geithner Plan: Restructuring Based on Better Information 
Overview 
In February 2009, the U.S. Treasury announced a comprehensive bank restructuring plan, the 
Financial Stability Plan (Geithner Plan). The plan tries first to evaluate the asset quality of 
systemically important banks through a specific examination of their assets’ risks (stress test or 
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program).38 This is compulsory for the 19 largest banks. Then 
the plan combines recapitalization (Capital Assistance Program) and asset purchase using 
private money (Public-Private Investment Program). These are voluntary in principle but 
semivoluntary in practice, since banks must meet the required capital criteria. In addition, the 
plan includes several conditions to prevent misuse of public money and to facilitate lending. In 
addition, the plan encourages banks to promote lending, especially to small businesses and 
communities, and to support homeowners, especially those facing foreclosure.  
 
Information Gathering and Communication 
In early May 2009, the Treasury reported the detailed results of the comprehensive stress test 
(Supervisory Capital Assessment Program). This is a forward-looking examination of bank 
solvency, since it identifies how much capital is needed to cope with future adverse shocks to the 
asset quality of each bank. It evaluates the future downside risk further than typical bank 
examination. The results confirmed that the largest banks were not insolvent and determined how 
much extra capital was needed, if any, for each bank to weather a future adverse shock. 
 
Liability-Side Restructuring: Recapitalization 
Banks are required to raise the extra capital identified by the stress test. This compulsory feature 
eliminates the signaling problem described in Section III. Banks can raise capital through private 
markets or by participating in a government scheme, the Capital Assistance Program. In this 
                                                                                                                                                             
started to lend up to $200 billion on a nonrecourse basis to holders of certain AAA-rated asset-backed securities 
(ABS) backed by newly and recently originated consumer and small business loans (Term Asset-Backed Securities 
Loan Facility, TALF). Banks were given incentives to increase new lending, since they would not face downside 
risk of valuation loss in the ABS.  
38 The authorities also plan to increase balance sheet transparency and disclosure. 
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program, banks will receive capital from the government by issuing preferred shares that 
automatically convert into common equity after seven years. An earlier conversion can be made 
at the issuer’s discretion with the approval of the regulator. The use of such hybrid securities 
minimizes the future cost of financial distress should asset values deteriorate further (as 
discussed in Section III E). The investment of the Treasury will be managed under a separate 
entity (Financial Stability Trust). 
 
Asset-Side Restructuring: Asset Sales 
Under the asset sales scheme (Public-Private Investment Program), the government solicits 
private investors for the purchase of troubled (legacy) loans and securities from banks. Slightly 
different schemes are provided for loans and securities. However, the key idea is to utilize 
private expertise and solicit it by guaranteeing the future losses and providing subsidized loans. 
 
Several funds will be set up to purchase legacy loans. Each fund will buy pools of legacy loans 
that are sold by banks. The price will be determined by competitive bidding by funds. In 
addition, inexpensive financing is available—each fund will receive 50 percent equity 
participation from the Treasury without voting rights and can also issue debt guaranteed by the 
FDIC (leverage ratio up to 6). The FDIC will supervise the funds.  
 
In addition, several funds will be set up to purchase legacy securities from banks. Eligible 
securities are nonagency residential mortgage-backed securities that were originally AAA rated 
and outstanding commercial mortgage-backed securities and ABS that are rated AAA. The 
Treasury will again provide a 50 percent equity stake without voting rights and lend money to 
each fund at up to a 2-to-1 leverage ratio. These are nonrecourse loans: if the asset values turn 
out to be very low, funds can default on the Treasury, and fund managers will not have any 
responsibility other than their losses on their own investment in the funds.  
 
The fact that the plan involves a government transfer is in line with our analysis of 
noncompulsory plans—a transfer is needed to convince banks to participate. The private sector 
involvement will lower the fiscal costs by utilizing private sector money as well as private sector 
expertise. Further evaluation of the plan requires assessment as to whether it minimizes the level 
of the government transfer, given the recapitalization objective. For this, it is necessary to 
evaluate how close the plan is to an optimal compensation scheme. There are two dimensions to 
consider. The first is the moral hazard problem in running the asset management funds. The 
government-sponsored inexpensive leverage is necessary to encourage private investors to take 
risks, but the risk taking might become more than optimal. The second consideration is the need 
to calibrate the subsidy provided to secure the participation of high-quality managers. A 
difficulty with the plan is estimating how the public subsidy will be shared between the banks 
and the fund managers (as Spence, 2009, stressed). It has been argued that the optimal subsidies 
could be calibrated using an auction to sell the management and cash flow rights (Bebchuk, 
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2009). This would require thorough preselection of qualified managers but might also set the 
equilibrium transfer to the banks to be less than intended.  
 
Corporate Governance 
To address potential moral hazard problems, the plan requires banks to restrict executive 
compensation, dividends, stock repurchases, and acquisitions. At the same time, the plan 
prohibits political interference in investment decisions, and the Treasury will make all contracts 
public.  
 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
When designing a restructuring plan for a systemically important bank, a key issue is to limit 
transfers from taxpayers. Essentially, this involves avoiding unnecessary subsidies to debt 
holders and maximizing the economic value created by the restructuring. We find that there is no 
magic bullet. Table 1 summarizes the pros and cons of various policy options. Some of our key 
findings are the following.  
 
• In a Modigliani-Miller framework in which cash flows are independent of capital 
structure, restructuring is theoretically possible by converting some debt into equity. This 
is, however, difficult in practice.  
• Without changing debt contracts, all restructuring involves transfers from the 
government. A plan subsidizing common equity issues and buying back debt is close to 
optimal. Subsidized asset sales are more costly to taxpayers, since debt holders benefit 
more.  
• The precise design of a restructuring should take into account the value created or 
destroyed because of changes in the participants’ behavior. Expertise and incentive of 
managers are concerns that should be addressed in restructuring. 
• If assets are undervalued as a result of liquidity or “lemons” problems, the government 
can make profits by buying assets above market value but below fundamental value. A 
caveat is that such undervaluation is difficult to assess.  
• Asymmetric information on the value of future payoffs makes equity holders reluctant to 
support restructurings involving new-claim issues. A restructuring impasse can be 
avoided through (1) conducting stress tests with credibly publicized results, (2) using 
compulsory rather than voluntary schemes, (3) providing contingent guarantees for banks 
to avoid new-claim issues, or (4) making banks issue low-information-sensitive claims 
such as convertible debt or preferred stocks.  
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• From a long-run perspective, it is important that managers and shareholders of bailed-out 
banks be punished in a way that discourages excessive future risk taking. 
Overall, the restructuring of a systemically important bank should combine several solutions to 
resolve multiple concerns and trade-offs on a case-by-case basis. In fact, the case studies are in 
line with our analysis. Although different schemes have been used in Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, all of them employ measures both on the asset side (e.g., sales 
of toxic assets) and on the liability side (e.g., recapitalization with preferred shares). In addition, 
the speed of events appeared to be a major friction when designing restructuring plans. However, 
there may be room for improvement. In particular, the costs to taxpayers and the final 
beneficiaries of the subsidies should be more transparent in all plans. Treatment of managers and 
shareholders could be less favorable.  
 
A restructuring plan cannot be judged by the stock market reaction. The reaction depends on the 
gap between ex ante anticipations and the announced plan—anticipated transfers may be larger 
or smaller than those in the announced plan. Moreover, even if the announcement comes as a 
surprise, a stock price increase may not be good news. On the one hand, it may suggest an 
increase in surplus, both private (e.g., reduction in the cost of financial distress) and social (e.g., 
stabilization of the financial system). On the other hand, it may also suggest too high a transfer to 
shareholders from taxpayers. In the case of compulsory plans, a good plan may clearly be 
associated with a decrease in stock prices as shareholders are forced to take some responsibility. 
 
In the long run, various frictions can and should be reduced to make systemic bank restructuring 
less complex and less costly. Specifically, a better legal framework should be designed, so that 
the renegotiation of debt can be handled more quickly and with a smaller threat of systemic 
meltdown. For example, opacity can be reduced by more timely and in-depth disclosure 
requirements for bank asset information and counterparty exposures. Regulation can give banks 
more incentives to include conversion clauses in their long-term debt contracts, so that such debt 
will automatically convert into equity in a distress situation.  
 
 37
 
 
 
T
ab
le
 1
. P
ro
s a
nd
 C
on
s o
f V
ar
io
us
 P
ol
ic
y 
O
pt
io
ns
 1
/
Fi
rs
t B
es
t
(H
on
or
in
g 
Ta
le
nt
 
M
or
al
 H
az
ar
d
A
dv
er
se
 
N
ea
r F
ut
ur
e
Lo
ng
-R
un
 V
ie
w
R
eg
ul
at
or
y
U
pf
ro
nt
D
eb
t C
on
tra
ct
s)
A
llo
ca
tio
n
Se
le
ct
io
n 
3/
D
ist
re
ss
Pu
ni
sh
m
en
t
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
t
Ta
xp
ay
er
 C
os
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
N
on
-s
ta
te
-c
on
tin
ge
nt
 m
ea
su
re
s
D
eb
t-f
or
-e
qu
ity
 sw
ap
+
n.
a.
n.
a.
n.
a.
n.
a.
n.
a.
n.
a.
+
−
R
ec
ap
ita
liz
at
io
n 
(w
ith
 d
eb
t r
ed
uc
tio
n)
W
ith
 c
om
m
on
 e
qu
ity
n.
a.
+
−
+
−
W
ith
 c
on
ve
rti
bl
e 
no
te
s
   
(H
ol
de
r c
on
ve
rts
 o
r m
an
da
to
ry
)
n.
a.
+
+
−
   
(Is
su
er
 c
on
ve
rts
)
n.
a.
+
−
+
+
−
W
ith
 p
re
fe
rre
d 
sh
ar
e
n.
a.
+
+
+
−
W
ith
 su
bo
rd
in
at
ed
 d
eb
t
n.
a.
+
+
−
A
ss
et
 p
ur
ch
as
e
n.
a.
−
+
−
−
  (
Ei
th
er
 v
ia
 a
ss
et
 m
an
ag
em
en
t c
om
pa
ny
 
   
or
 g
oo
d 
ba
nk
/b
ad
 b
an
k)
St
at
e-
co
nt
in
ge
nt
 m
ea
su
re
s
Li
m
ite
d 
lo
ss
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
 o
n 
as
se
t f
or
 b
an
ks
n.
a.
+
−
+
+
+
Lo
ss
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
 o
n 
lia
bi
lit
y 
fo
r l
ia
bi
lit
y 
ho
ld
er
s
n.
a.
+
−
+
+
+
R
ec
ap
ita
liz
at
io
n 
w
ith
 lo
ss
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
 o
n 
eq
ui
ty
n.
a.
+
−
+
+
+
O
nl
y 
fo
r n
ew
 e
qu
ity
 h
ol
de
rs
 (C
ab
al
le
ro
)
G
oo
d/
ba
d 
ba
nk
 sp
lit
 w
ith
 re
co
ur
se
 c
on
di
tio
n
n.
a.
−
+
−
+
−
+
W
ith
 lo
ss
 p
ai
d 
by
 e
qu
ity
 o
f g
oo
d 
ba
nk
 (S
ac
hs
)
1/
 +
 in
di
ca
te
s t
he
 re
st
ru
ct
ur
in
g 
pl
an
s t
ha
t a
re
 w
or
th
 c
on
si
de
rin
g 
w
hi
le
 −
 in
di
ca
te
s t
ho
se
 th
at
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
av
oi
de
d.
2/
 A
ss
es
sm
en
t i
s m
ad
e 
fo
r t
he
 c
as
es
 w
ith
ou
t r
en
eg
ot
ia
tin
g 
th
e 
de
bt
 c
on
tra
ct
s.
3/
 A
ss
es
sm
en
t i
s b
as
ed
 o
n 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
pl
an
s. 
C
om
pu
ls
or
y 
pl
an
s c
an
 e
lim
in
at
e 
th
is
 p
ro
bl
em
. A
ls
o,
  t
he
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t c
an
 m
iti
ga
te
 th
is
 p
ro
bl
em
 w
ith
 ri
go
ro
us
 b
an
k 
ex
am
in
at
io
n.
En
do
ge
no
us
 S
ur
pl
us
 2
/
Fu
tu
re
 C
on
ce
rn
s 2
/
O
th
er
 C
on
ce
rn
s
C
on
st
an
t S
ur
pl
us
 38
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Andrade, Gregory, and Steven Kaplan, 1998, “How Costly Is Financial (Not Economic) 
Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed,” 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, No. 5, pp. 1443–1493.  
 
Ausubel, Lawrence M., and Peter Cramton, 2008, “Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan,” 
The Economists’ Voice, Vol. 5, Iss. 5, Article 5. 
 
Bebchuk, Lucian A., 2009, “Buying Troubled Assets,” The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion 
Paper, No. 636. 
 
Bulow, Jeremy, and Paul Klemperer, 2009, “Reorganising the Banks: Focus on the Liabilities, 
Not the Assets,” VOX, March 21. 
 
Caballero, Ricardo J., 2009, “A (Mostly) Private Capital Assistance Program (CAP),” RGE 
Monitor, March 17. 
 
Diamond, Douglas, Steve Kaplan, Anil Kashyap, Raghuram Rajan, and Richard Thaler, 2008, 
“Fixing the Paulson Plan,” The Wall Street Journal, September 26–28. 
 
Hoshi, Takeo, and Anil K. Kashyap, 2008, “Will the U.S. Bank Recapitalization Succeed? 
Lessons from Japan,” NBER Working Paper No. 14401 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
National Bureau of Economic Research). 
 
Johnson, Simon, and James Kwak, 2009, “Geithner’s Plan Isn’t Money in the Bank,” The Los 
Angeles Times, March 24. 
 
Majluf, Nicholas S., and Stewart C. Myers, 1984, “Corporate Financing and Investment 
Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 187–221. 
 
Modigliani, Franco, and Merton Miller, 1958, “The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance, and the 
Theory of Investment,” American Economic Review, Vol. 48, pp. 261–97. 
 
Myers, Stewart C., 1977, “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing,” Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 5, pp. 147–75. 
 
Philippon, Thomas, and Philipp Schnabl, 2009, “Constrained-Efficient Mechanisms Against 
Debt Overhang” (unpublished; New York: New York University). 
 
Rajan, Raghuram, 2008, “Desperate Times Need the Right Measures,” Financial Times,  
September 19. 
 
 39
 
 
 
Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole, 1996, “Payment Systems Research and Public Policy 
Risk, Efficiency, and Innovation,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 28, No. 4, 
Part 2, pp. 733–62. 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey, 2009, “A Proposal on How to Clean the Banks,” The Huffington Post, February 
12.  
 
Spence, Michael, 2009, “The Geithner Plan: Criticisms Are Off the Mark,” Financial Times, 
April 7. 
 
Stein, Jeremy, 1992, “Convertible Bonds as Backdoor Equity Financing,” Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 32, pp. 3–21. 
 
Tirole, Jean, 2006, The Theory of Corporate Finance (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press). 
 
Zingales, Luigi, 2009, “Yes, We Can, Secretary Geithner,” The Economists’ Voice, Vol. 6, Iss. 2, 
Article 3. 
 
 
 
  
